Author: Chris Henrichsen

The feminist idea of care is both a response to the canon of ethical and political theory as well as an alternative approach to that cannon. In this essay, I contend that caring relationships are a valuable and necessary component of a just society, and as a result necessary in any theoretical argument about social justice. Yet, it could be asked whether the theory of social justice advanced by the philosopher John Rawls adequately incorporates the idea of care. I will argue here that the concept of care is an important aspect of Rawls’ theory.

Care and Justice

The care perspective was first identified by Carol Gilligan who argued that there are two moral voices: justice and care. Justice, the masculine approach to morality, focuses on universal abstract principles such as equality, impartiality, and universality. The classic justice perspective is Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. The categorical imperative asserts that we should act according to principles that we would want to be followed as universal laws. In other words, when I indentify the principle of a given act, I must ask whether I would want all people to follow that principle in all cases. If the answer is in the affirmative, then that is a morally justified act. If the answer is negative, then I should not act upon such principles. Continue reading “Care and the Liberal Theory of Justice”

Introduction

A feminist analysis of any major thinker or school of thought within the historical canon of political theory is bound to find many problems. This is surely the case when considering the social contract tradition and the most prominent modern thinkers within this tradition: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacque Rousseau. To a certain extent these thinkers make many of the same mistakes that classical and other modern moral and political theorists made. First, women are often ignored as significant moral and political actors. Second, when given attention, women are often either disparaged or solely acknowledged for their reproductive function. Third, descriptions of human nature are often limited to “male” nature and fail to take into account elements of care as part of human nature.

Within the canon of political theory, only Plato and John Stuart Mill give due consideration to women and Mill’s writings are likely to only ones considered to be “feminist.” However, this should not lead us to dismiss all other thought between Plato and Mill. Instead, we must ask ourselves whether the theories proposed by theorists, such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, can be adapted or corrected. Can the theories of these men be salvaged despite the sexism of their day? I am not one to give a free pass to any theorist because of their place and time. These are thinkers who sought to view the world and the state in different ways. Yet when it came to women, far too often they accepted the world around them.

In looking at the modern social contract theorists, we will see that they all have elements which a feminist can appreciate and draw from. Hobbes’ description of fear can be useful in understanding the actions of those living in a war-like domestic situation. Locke shows a certain respect for the natural rights of women. Rousseau’s account of pity in human nature shows an early appreciation for what contemporary feminists will call an element of care.

However, despite some of the strengths in these respective theories, the social contract approach itself makes it difficult to accept the weaknesses which they contain. All of these theories place a heavy emphasis on their description of human nature and it is in their description of human nature that we often find problems. Can any description of human nature that fails to take into account the fact that women are fully human be used as the basis of a moral and political theory? I do not think so, particularly when we consider that these thinkers have given such a central significance to their account of human nature. For this reason, we have to look elsewhere to find the best conception of political theory. Continue reading “Feminism and the Social Contract”

I taught parts of Deuteronomy in my Sunday School class this past Sunday. The class is with high school juniors and seniors. They are a great group (and not just because I brought donuts today). During Priesthood I wrote down the following thought:

I was struck by much of what I read in Deuteronomy. However, I was particularly drawn into the treatment of wealth in Chapter 8.

The chapter starts with Moses reminding the Israelites of their humbling experiences, as well as the care that the Lord provided the in the wilderness.

In verses 7-9, Moses paints a picture of the promised land which awaits them. In verse 9 has says that this will a “land wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarceness, thou shalt not lack any thing in it…”

With it also being a “land of brooks of water” (v. 7) and “a land of oil olive, and honey,” Moses’ promised land sounds very similar to Rousseau’s depiction of nature. Continue reading “Wealth and Pride in the OT”

Not sure if I hate the sin, but I hate this saying.

I have been thinking about the idea of autonomy developed by Immanuel Kant. For Kant, the thing which makes humans special (and deserving of dignity) is that they are able to choose for themselves their own conception of the good life. Not only can we choose a conception of the good life (the type of life we want to live), but we can revise that conception as life goes on.

As a philosopher, I should be able explain why this is the best argument. Not sure if I am up to that task. The best I can do for this post is to say that Kant’s view of autonomy and the good life expresses how I feel about freedom and morality better than anything else that I have read and contemplated.

This brings me to the underlying issue of the post: can one be a Mormon Kantian or a Kantian Mormon. I have briefly discussed this in a number of places with Russell Arben Fox and Nate Oman. Both think that it is not possible to reconcile Mormonism and Kantian liberalism. Well, guess what? I have decided that they are right (not on everything, just this point). However, this does not mean that I am no longer a Kantian. Also, it does not mean that I am no longer a Mormon. What is means is that I am no longer interested in justifying the existence of such thing as a theory of Kantian Mormonism (or Mormon Kantianism). I am a Kantian. I am a Mormon. Are these two aspects of my life a good fit? No. Do I care? Sort of. But it is who I am. Consistent? Nope. Authentic? Absolutely! This is what I have spent the last decade looking for and I think that I may have found it. Continue reading “On the Saying “Love the Sinner, Hate the Sin””

I brought Lowell Bennion’s “Do Justly and Love Mercy: Moral Issues for Mormons” to church with me today, I got it for Christmas and I have wanted to take a closer glance. What I have discovered in reading Bennion is that his way of thinking closely mirrors mine. Well…sort of. He is clearly smarter, more articulate, and more faithful than me. However, his thought seems to reflect an engagement with the great moral and social thinkers of the Western cannon, particularly Aristotle and Kant. I find that Bennion provides a humanistic approach to Christianity and Mormonism that I have not found elsewhere.
I thought to myself this morning “I should start a series of posts on my thoughts about Bennion.” But, I have a number of things that I should be doing instead. However, things changed this afternoon, when I came across the following 2004 comment on Times and Seasons:

However, right up there I would put just about anything ever published by Lowell Bennion. And I feel really bad about that. By all accounts — including from several folks I know well and greatly respect — he was a wonderful person. He clearly had a huge impact on a great many people, but maybe it was exposure to him in person that made the difference. (I never met him.) I’ve also been told about his brilliance, his wonderful dissertation on Max Weber at Strasbourg, etc., etc. He has been characterized to me as one of the leading Mormon intellectuals of all time. But I just can’t see it. Everything I’ve ever read by him seemed, well, pedestrian.

I realize that he devoted much of his time and energy to charitable endeavors, to service and to teaching. And I have no doubt that that is choosing the better part. In hundreds of thousands of cases, the world would be better off if the wood used to produce books had been left in the forest and the time and energy of their authors had been devoted to charity, instead. But, while Brother Bennion may have been a saint, his writing leaves me, at least, entirely cold.

This got me a bit worked up. Brother Peterson may be an expert on ancient scripture and languages, but I get the feeling from the comment that he did not understand the purpose of Bennion’s intellectual project, or the connection between that project and his service and teaching.

Like Hugh Nibley or Leonard Arrington, I never knew Bennion. His son was President of Ricks College when I was a student there, but that was long before I knew of Lowell Bennion, a name I first encountered at the University of Utah, where the Service Learning center is named after him. Having worked in the social service sector in Utah, I am familiar with his reputation in the Salt Lake City-area non=profit community. However, my introduction to his work is much more recent. I think I may have found what I was looking for and I would like to investigate it with you here at FPR.

I am looking to put together a panel for Sunstone on the broadly-defined category of Mormonism, Politics, and Ideology. I have some ideas for what I might do. I am now looking for the rest of the panel. Anybody interested?

Below is the Call for Papers with other conference info:

Sunstone

Authors Note: This is not an essay/post about Glenn Beck. The ideas below have been bouncing around my head since Fall 1999 when I was first introduced to the philosophy of John Rawls.

This is not about the crass politics of talk radio, but instead about a philosophical debate which dates back to Plato. In particular, this argument is one deeply rooted in the works of Rousseau, Hume, and Kant.

The following is still in a rough form. It represents the notes I used for my presentation at the Society for Mormon Theology Conference last month. Feel free to point out typos.

Themes related to social justice and social equality can be found in a number of places in the Book of Mormon. A challenge in applying such principles to today is that the communities found in the Book of Mormon were small, tribalistic theocracies. While the spiritual messages of ancient scripture seem relevant to us today, what about the socio-economic messages?

Attempts to craft contemporary arguments about political economy within Mormon thought have placed heavy emphasis on the early communal experiments of modern Mormonism (Arrington 1958, Arrington, May, and Fox 1976). These studies, however, are more focused on nineteenth century communalism than they are an argument about equality or the redistribution of wealth.

Warner Woodworth has attempted to use the Mormon concept of Zion to craft an approach to business ethics (Lucas and Woodworth 1999). In this work he addresses primarily the business applications of the idea of Zion, but he also addresses the differences (as he sees it) between the concept and the theoretical approaches to political economy of Adam Smith and Karl Marx. He has also used the Book of Mormon account of utopia in the Book of 4 Nephi to argue for a concept of socio-economy which is based on social cooperation (Woodworth 1994). While Woodworth makes passing reference to Amitai Etzioni, the communitarian sociologist, this is still does not approach a serious interpretation of distributive justice.

This last essay by Woodworth is similar in style (though much briefer) to the arguments about wealth and economics found in Approaching Zion by Hugh Nibley (1989). They both make interesting arguments using ancient scripture. Nibley, in particular, makes

arguments using the Book of Mormon and the Old Testament to critique concepts of greed and inequality in modern society. The primary weakness of Nibley’s works is that while they are deeply rooted in scripture and other ancient texts, they lack any form of systematic analysis. That said, Nibley does serve as an inspiration for much of the argument that follows. In particular, Nibley blasts the idea of desert as it pertains to wealth as being inconsistent with Mormon Scripture.

Method

In analyzing the themes of equality and distributive justice found in the Book of Mormon, I want to borrow for the theoretical toolbox of Thomas Aquinas. In his writings on virtue, Aquinas uses the secular writings of Aristotle to give structure and analytical rigor to scripture, in particular the discussions of virtue found in the epistles of Paul.

While Aquinas injects heavy doses of Aristotle into his entire treatment of Christian/Catholic theology, my project is far more modest. I will be using the theory of distributive justice of John Rawls as a means of analyzing elements of distributive justice found in the Book of Mormon. The hope is that in using an analytical theory like that of Rawls to expound upon scripture, it can form the basis of a Mormon conception of distributive justice. This is the start of that project.

In looking at the question of distributive justice in the Book of Mormon from a Rawlsian perspective, I will be looking at three areas: justification, equality, and desert.

Justification and Justice as Fairness.

While fairness may not be something commonly found in the world, we can imagine what the conditions of fairness might appear like. This is what Rawls does when he introduces the original position (OP). The original position is a hypothetical situation where representatives come together to determine the principles of justice that will govern the basic structure of society (the basic structure being the political and economic institutions which impacts ones life-chances). It is these principles that would guide the development of a constitution and further development of law and policy.
In order to ensure that these principles are chosen under fair conditions. Rawls introduces the device known as the veil of ignorance. The

veil of ignorance prevents the participants from knowing the particulars of their own situation and standing in the world. They are unaware of their own wealth, gender, race, and geographical situation. They are essentially stripped of the knowledge that might lead than to pick principles of justice which benefit themselves or people like themselves rather than principles that benefit all and which could be accepted by all.

They are not completely ignorant for they are aware of, if not knowledgeable about a range of topics including law, economics, psychology, science, and sociology. In other words, they are aware of the facts needed to understand the human condition. They know that there is wealth and poverty but what they do not know is whether they themselves are poor (or rich).
Susan Moller Okin argues that while Rawls’ theory is “sometimes viewed as excessively rationalistic, individualistic, and abstracted from real human beings,” it should instead be viewed as a “voice of responsibility, care, and concern for others.” We can find this to be the case in the original position. Since the parties are referred to as mutually disinterested it may seem that the construct is overly rationalistic and individualistic. However, Okin argues that this would be a misreading or misunderstanding of the original position because “Rawls does have to rely on empathy, benevolence, and equal concern for others as for self, in order to have the parties come up with the principles they choose, especially the difference principle.” Rawls addresses this when he says that the “combination of mutual disinterest and the veil of ignorance achieves the same purpose as benevolence. For this combination of conditions forces each person in the original position to take the good of others into account.”

Rawls emphasizes that the veil of ignorance does not impose benevolence because such a “strong condition” is not needed. Instead, what the veil of ignorance does is require the participants to consider others in their deliberation about the principles of justice. While rational self-interest plays a part in such deliberations, we are not aware of which “self” we are because of the conditions of the veil or ignorance. Okin goes as far as to say that the veil “is such a demanding stipulation that it converts what would, without it, be self-interest into benevolence or the equal concern for others” While Rawls shies away from the term benevolence, Okin argues that the veil of ignorance at least delivers a concern for others with the power of benevolence. I fully agree with Okin’s interpretation of the original position. While the original position may incorporate certain elements of rational self-interest, the primary purpose of the original position construct is to arrive at principles of justice which go beyond the mere pursuit of self interest. Since the parties are unaware of their own particular situations, the only way in which one can look after one’s own self-interest is to look after the interests of all equally. Continue reading “Rawlsian Social Justice Themes in Mormon Thought”

Yesterday, I presented on Rawlsian social justice themes found in the Book of Mormon at the seventh annual meeting of the Society for Mormon Philosophy and Theology. Mormon Times of the Deseret News did an article about me presentation.

The article does a good job of picking up on some of my main points. As a former reporter, I know that these type of presentations are not easy to cover. I would like to thank Michael De Groote for coming to the speech and the article. I was not expecting it.

I would also like to thank Blake Ostler for kindly introducing me. I also received some great comments and questions from Blake, James McLachlan, Ben Huff, and Jennifer Lane.

I will post the paper, including segments not covered at SMPT, here at FPR later this week. Check out the Mormon Times write up for now.

I write about social justice, mostly the theory of justice presented by the late philosopher John Rawls. I am not looking to add anything new today. But considering the recent comments by Brother Beck, I want to point out some of the things which I, a Mormon, has had to say about social justice.

I have written about the moral justification of liberal justice in two posts (here and a much updated version here).

I have looked at the economic and social implications both here at FPR and at this post on BCC. These are both central to what I view as social justice. I also introduce John Rawls and my Mormon Rawls Project at this post.

My sense of justice influences everything, from my view of nationalism and patriotism, to the way in which I analyze church policies about caring for the poor.

These views are mine. I do not claim that they represent the views of the Church or that they are the only possible interpretation of certain scripture. However, my Mormonism and my sense of justice are one and the same for me. It might be a different perspective, but it is mine

Oh, I forgot about the podcast on global social justice.